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WHAT WOULD DARWIN SAY?: THE MIS-
EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Michaelj O'Connor*
Charles Darwin created the theory of evolution, which states that
species evolve over time, and the strongest within each species survive
and continue the evolution of the species while the rest are killed
off-or something like that.' Had Darwin been a lawyer instead of a
scientist, his theory might have gone something like this: law evolves
over time, and the best judicial decisions survive and become part of
the precedent on which the future of the law is built while the rest are
overruled, forgotten, or killed off-or something like that. Assuming
that this theory roughly describes the system of stare decisis in the
American legal system, it is a wonder that the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has reached its current state. It should
have been overruled or forgotten a long time ago so that it could
evolve into a stronger species. Yet the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence continues to live and evolve, defying the law of natural
selection. As a result, a new Eighth Amendment, with a questionable
history, was born in the Court's recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia.2
In Atkins, the Supreme Court categorically exempted the men-
tally retarded from the death penalty, holding that executions of the
mentally retarded are cruel and unusual punishments in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.3 More precisely, the Court held that capital
punishment is ipso facto a disproportionate punishment for any of-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003. B.S., Villanova
University, 1999. 1 would like to thank Professors Richard Garnett and William Kelley
for changing the way I view the Law, and more importantly, for making me think. I
also thank my parents for their years of love, support, and encouragement. Finally, I
thank my amazing wife Sue, without whom, none of this would have been possible.
1 This Note does not purport to describe accurately Darwin's theory for scientific
purposes.
2 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
3 Id. at 2251-52. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
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fense committed by one who is mentally retarded. 4 In reaching its
decision, the majority, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, rested its rea-
soning on too-often-accepted legal principles and questionable
"facts."
According to Justice Stevens, a claim that a punishment is uncon-
stitutionally excessive is judged by "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'5 Furthermore, the determi-
nation whether punishment in a particular case is unconstitutionally
excessive in light of evolving community standards should be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible, with the
"clearest and most reliable" factor being "legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures. 'n After setting forth this framework to govern
its analysis, the Court found a national consensus rejecting application
of the death penalty to the mentally retarded, based largely on the fact
that several states have recently enacted legislation to exempt the
mentally retarded from the death penalty. 7
Although the Atkins outcome is both laudable and altruistic, the
legal standard and methodology employed by the Court to achieve
that outcome are constitutionally suspect. Atkins, however, is not with-
out precedent; the Supreme Court has, in the past, applied similar
legal standards to the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the
Eighth Amendment.8 This Note contends that since 1958,9 the
Eighth Amendment has "mis-evolved" into the current species that
supports the Atkins decision. This Note traces that evolution and at-
tempts to show where it went wrong.
This Note details the history and evolution of the Eighth Amend-
ment to show that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, re-
sulting in its decision in Atkins, is faithful neither to the Eighth
Amendment itself, the Constitution, notions of federalism, nor theo-
ries of legislation in a representative democracy. It is, however, faith-
ful to past decisions by pluralities of the Court.' Specifically, Part I
challenges the notion that the Eighth Amendment must utilize as its
4 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
5 Id. at 2247 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
6 1(. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
7 Id. at 2248-50.
8 See, e.g., Penny, 492 U.S. at 340 (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit capital punishment for the mentally retarded). The
Penry Court applied an identical legal standard, but reached a different outcome than
Atkins based on factual differences.
9 1958 marks the year that the Supreme Court decided Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). For a discussion of Trop, see infra Part l.B.
10 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion) (apply-
ing a legal framework similar to Atkins).
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hallmark the "evolving standards of decency." Part I argues that the
Court created this standard without adequately explaining its reasons
for doing so. Part II challenges the notion that state legislation is the
best objective indicator of society's evolving standards of decency, and
concludes that this level of deference is inconsistent with precedent
and considerations of federalism. Part II further concludes that a con-
sensus among various states' legislation may not accurately reflect a
national consensus, and, therefore, state legislation should be aban-
doned as the judicial measuring stick.
This Note does not advocate that the mentally retarded be sub-
ject to the death penalty. Rather, this Note utilizes the Atkins decision
in an attempt to show the faulty reasoning behind the Court's legal
analysis in the context of the Eighth Amendment. This Note traces
the evolution of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause in an
effort to show where the Court lost its way. This Note does not contest
the correctness of the final result in Atkins, only the methodology
used to achieve that result.
I. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
A. The Origins of the Eighth Amendment's Ban on Cruel and
Unusual Punishment
The popular history of the Eighth Amendment recites that the
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" can be
traced to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and even back to the
Magna Carta.1 In fact, the language of the Eighth Amendment is
identical to that of the English Bill of Rights. 12 Even though the
clause itself came from the English Bill of Rights, from the beginning,
the American version meant something different than did the English
version.' 3 The English clause prohibited only those punishments that
were disproportionate to the offense or were excessive.14
11 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Orig-
inal Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 845-60 (1969). For a detailed history of the Eighth
Amendment's adoption and original meaning, see Justice Scalia's opinion in Hannelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-85 (1991). Note that Justice Scalia's opinion relies
heavily on Granucci.
12 Granucci, supra note II at 840.
13 See id. at 847 ("It is indeed a paradox that the American colonists omitted a
prohibition on excessive punishments and adopted instead the prohibition of cruel
methods of punishment, which had never existed in English law.").
14 See id. at 860 ("The English evidence shows that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was . . . a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties.").
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The American clause, however, originally prohibited only "tortu-
ous or barbaric punishments."' 15 The clause was not intended by the
Framers to prohibit excessive punishments.' 6 Rather, it was not until
15 See id. at 842; cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White,J., dissenting) (citing BENIJA-
MIN OLIVER, THE RICHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 185-86 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin
& T. Johnson 1832)). The citation stated,
No express restriction is laid in the constitution, upon the power of impris-
oning for crimes. But, as it is forbidden to demand unreasonable bail, which
merely exposes the individual concerned, to imprisonment in case he can-
not procure it; as it is forbidden to impose unreasonable fines, on account of
the difficulty the person fined would have of paying them, the default of
which would be punished by imprisonment only, it would seem, that impris-
onment for an unreasonable length of time, is also contrary to the spirit of
the constitution. Thus in cases where the courts have a discretionary power
to fine and imprison, shall it be supposed, that the power to fine is re-
strained, but the power to imprison is wholly unrestricted by it? In the ab-
sence of all express regulations on the subject, it would surely be absurd to
imprison an individual for a term of years, for some inconsiderable offence,
and consequently it would seem, that a law imposing so severe a punishment
must be contrary to the intention of the framers of the constitution.
Id. (citing OLIVER); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White stated,
Even if one were to accept the argument that the First Congress did not have
in mind the proportionality issue, the evidence would hardly be strong
enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the propor-
tionality component. Had there been an intention to exclude it from the
reach of the words that otherwise could reasonably be construed to include
it, perhaps as plain-speaking Americans, the Members of the First Congress
would have said so. And who can say with confidence what the members of
the state ratifying conventions had in mind when they voted in favor of the
Amendment?
Id. at 1011 (White, J., dissenting). After his discussion of history in Harmelin, Justice
White turned to Supreme Court precedent to support his position that the Amend-
ment was meant to prohibit more than merely barbaric punishments. QuotingJustice
Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field,J., dissenting),
Justice White wrote, "The inhibition [of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause]
was directed, not only against punishments which inflict torture, 'but against all pun-
ishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offenses charged.'" Yet, examination of Justice Field's O'Neil opinion reveals thatJus-
tice Field cited no authority (historical or otherwise) for this proposition. Id. (Field,
J., dissenting).
16 See Granucci, supra note 11, at 842 ("Expressions in the first congress confirm
the view that the cruel and unusual punishments clause was directed at prohibiting
certain methods of punishment."). Furthermore, "[f]ollowing adoption, state and
federal jurists accepted the view that the clause prohibited certain methods of punish-
ments .... Attempts to extend the meaning of the clause to cover any punishment
disproportionate to the crime were rebuffed throughout the nineteenth century and
commentators believed the clause to be obsolete." Id.
[VOL. 78:41392
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1892 that the Supreme Court first recognized the possibility that the
Eighth Amendment could also contain a proportionality require-
ment. 17 Thus, at its adoption, the Eighth Amendment prohibited
only certain methods of punishment.' 8 Not long after its adoption,
however, the Amendment was construed also to prohibit excessive
punishments. 19 Although the Atkins decision purports to outlaw exe-
cution of the mentally retarded based on proportionality, the follow-
ing discussion must begin by addressing a case of the "method of
punishment" genre.
B. The Appearance and Evolution of "Evolving Standards of Decency"--
Misplaced Reliance on Trop v. Dulles
Trop v. Dulles20 is one of the most famous and most often cited
cases dealing with the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.21 Yet subsequent judicial reliance on Trop's lofty lan-
guage is often misplaced. At issue in Trop was the constitutionality of
a statute2 2 authorizing denationalization for desertion from the U.S.
Army during a time of war.23 ChiefJustice Warren, writing for himself
and three otherJustices, gave two alternative theories under which the
statute authorizing denationalization was unconstitutional. First, the
plurality held that the government did not have the power to divest a
person of his citizenship. 24 In so holding, the opinion stated, "[A]s
17 See id. at 842-43 (discussing O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 323). In O'Neil, the defendant
raised the issue that his punishment was "cruel and unusual" because of the dispro-
portion between his crime and his punishment. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331-32. The
Court refused to address this argument. Id. The dissent, however, stated that "the
whole inhibition [of the Eighth Amendment] is against that which is excessive." Id. at
842 (quoting ONeil, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting)).
18 Granucci, supra note 11, at 842.
19 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357, 380-81 (1910) (holding that a
sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment was cruel and unusual punishment for falsify-
ing an official public document).
20 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
21 A KeyCite of Trop on Westlaw reveals well over 2000 citations. KeyCite of Trop,
356 U.S. at 86 (performed Feb. 27, 2003).
22 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 4, § 401(g), 54 Stat. 1168, 1169, amended by 58 Stat.
4 (1944), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978).
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturali-
zation, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (g) Deserting the military or naval
forces of the United States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof
by court martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed or dishon-
orably discharged from the service of such military of naval forces ....
Id.
23 Trap, 356 U.S. at 87-88.
24 Id. at 92-93.
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long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizen-
ship, . . . his fundamental right of citizenship is secure. On this
ground alone the judgment in this case should be reversed."25 Yet the
opinion went on to state a second reason why the denationalization
could not be upheld, and this second reason, which was no more than
dicta in the case, has found a home in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
The Court's second basis for declaring the statute authorizing de-
nationalization unconstitutional was that the purpose of the statute
was punitive, and denationalization was "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.26 The opinion noted
that because desertion was punishable by death, denationalization was
not "excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime." 27 Instead, the
question was "whether [denationalization] subjects the individual to a
fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by
the Eighth Amendment."2 8 In lofty, often-quoted language, the Court
reasoned, "[T] he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man."2 11 It continued, "[T] he Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."341 The opinion contin-
ued to extol the virtues of the Constitution, singing the praises of how
the Constitution trumps even the most well-reasoned statute, if that
statute is indeed unconstitutional.31
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the power
to denationalize a citizen for wartime desertion was beyond Con-
gress's power because there existed no rational relation between the
questioned statute and Congress's war power.32 The dissent, consist-
25 Id. at 93.
26 Id. at 99-103.
27 Id. at 99.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 100. Notably, the Court cited no precedent for this assertion. One
would expect the plurality, upon memorializing such a bold statement in the United
States Reporter, to at least cite debates about the purpose of the Amendment, The Feder-
alist, or some other authority to support its conclusion that the "basic concept under-
lying the Eighth Amendment" is indeed "the dignity of man."
30 Id. at 101.
31 See id. at 103-04.
32 Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concurrence stated,
I therefore must conclude that § 401 (g) is beyond the power of Con-
gress to enact .... But here, any substantial achievement, by this device, of
Congress' legitimate purposes under the war power seems fairly remote. ...
I can only conclude that the requisite rational relation between this statute
and the war power does not appear . .,
[VOL. 78:41394
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ing of four Justices, 34 argued that because death was a permissible
punishment for wartime desertion, denationalization-which is surely
less harsh than death-could not be prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 34
And thus was born the notion that the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment utilized "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and that human
dignity was the core value protected by the Amendment. These pro-
positions recur throughout Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 35 Yet
subsequent opinions seem to overlook the fact that the Court cited no
authority to support this conclusion.36 Atkins and other opinions
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
33 The dissent was authored by Justice Frankfurter and joined by Justices Burton,
Clark, and Harlan. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002).
36 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01. The opinion stated,
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amend-
ment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civi-
lized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed
depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the
bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. This Court
has had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment,
and, in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not surprising. But
when the Court was confronted with a punishment of 12 years in irons at
hard and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records, it
did not hesitate to declare that the penalty was cruel in its excessiveness and
unusual in its character. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349. The Court
recognized in that case that the words of the Amendment are not precise,
[FN32] and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.
Id. Footnote 32 of the opinion stated,
Whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different from
"cruel" is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the
meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness
do not seem to have been drawn. See Weems v. United States, supra; O'Neil v.
Vermont, supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra. These cases indicate that the Court
simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic pro-
hibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of
meaning that might be latent in the word "unusual." But cf. In re Kemmler,
supra, [136 U.S. at 443]; United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub-
lishing Co. v. Burleson, 225 U.S. 407, 430 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). If the
word "unusual" is to have any meaning apart from the word "cruel," how-
ever, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something differ-
ent from that which is generally done. Denationalization as a punishment
2003] 1395
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overlook the fact that the controlling opinion was that of a four-Justice
plurality.37 Courts and commentators do not seem to be troubled by
the fact that because Justice Brennan's concurring opinion was much
more narrow-in fact, it did not even address the Eighth Amend-
ment 38-the quoted language was only dicta. And no one seems to
care that the "evolving standards" principle finds little support in the
history or text of the Amendment,39 and only tangential support in
precedent. Instead, the Court has grasped this language and used it
to shape Eighth Amendment jurisprudence over the last forty-plus
years. This Note will now examine that jurisprudence, specifically as it
relates to the death penalty and the evolving standards of decency.
C. Death Penalty Cases
1. Furman v. Georgia
In Furman v. Georgia,40 one of the first modern death penalty
cases, the question before the Court was whether three death penalty
sentences imposed by Georgia and Texas courts violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.4' In a highly
fragmented per curiam opinion, five members of the Court held that
the imposition of the death sentences violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.42 Each of the five Justices wrote his own concurring opinion, 43
two claiming that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punish-
ment for all crimes.44 The other concurring Justices, however, in es-
sence argued that the method in which the death penalty was applied
violated the Amendment. 45 In so doing, their argument was literally
certainly meets this test. It was never explicitly santioned by this Govern-
ment until 1940 and never tested against the Constitution until this day.
Id. at 100 n.32.
37 Chief Justice Warren announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an
opinion which Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker joined. Id. at 86.
38 Id. at 105-14 (Brennan,J., concurring).
39 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
40 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
41 Id. at 239.
42 Id. at 239-40.
43 Id. at 240.
44 Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty violates
the Eighth Amendment per se. Id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 370 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
45 See id. at 240-42 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
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more of a procedural due process argument than an Eighth Amend-
ment argument. 46
2. Gregg v. Georgia
In Gregg v. Georgia,47 the Court addressed whether the punish-
ment of death under Georgia law was an ipso facto violation of the
Eighth Amendment.48 In another highly fragmented opinion, the
Court concluded that the punishment of death for the crime of mur-
der was not, in all circumstances, "cruel and unusual punishment. '4t)
The lead opinion was authored by Justice Stewart, and joined by Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens °.5 0 Justice White, Chief Justice Burger, and
Justice Rehnquist concurred,5 1 and Justice Blackmun concurred in a
separate opinion.52
Justice Stewart began his analysis by noting that "the Court has
not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to
'barbarous' methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th cen-
tury." 5 3 Rather, he wrote, "[T]he Amendment has been interpreted
in a flexible and dynamic manner. The Court early recognized that 'a
principle, to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth.' "54 The Court continued, "[T]hus the
Clause forbidding 'cruel and unusual' punishments 'is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a humane justice.15 5 The opinion then discussed Weems
v. United States56 to show how the Amendment's meaning changed
46 See id. at 399 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger wrote,
The Eighth Amendment was included in the Bill or Rights to assure that
certain types of punishments would never be imposed, not to channelize the
sentencing process. The approach of these concurring opinions has no an-
tecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases. It is essentially and exclusively a
procedural due process argument.
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 399 n.28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (assert-
ing thatJustice White appeared to be "more concerned with a regularized sentencing
process").
47 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 158.
49 Id. at 168-87.
50 Id. at 158.
51 Id. at 207 (White, J., concurring, with Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., joining).
52 Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 171.
54 Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
55 Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 378).
56 217 U.S. at 373 (holding that a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment was
cruel and unusual punishment for falsifying an official public document).
20031
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
from prohibiting only certain forms of punishment to prohibiting dis-
proportionate punishment. 57 The opinion next undertook a brief dis-
cussion of Trop, and reached the conclusion that "[i]t is clear from
the foregoing precedents that the Eighth Amendment has not been
regarded as a static concept. '5- It then dropped the famous line from
Trop that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' 59 Hence, after Gregg, the Eighth Amendment required (1)
that punishment not be barbaric or torturous in its methods,60 (2)
that it not involve the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"61
and (3) that punishment "must not be grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. ' 2
The Court's conclusion, however, was not fairly based on the
cases that it cited for support. Trop aside, the opinion cited cases that
stand for the proposition that the Amendment requires proportional-
ity. 63 It then grabbed hold of Trop's famous dicta that states that the
concepts of barbarous punishments and proportionality must change
with time, as society matures. In essence, the Court cited cases to
show how the Amendment has changed in one way since its inclusion
in the Bill of Rights-the Amendment now also prohibits dispropor-
tionate punishments-and then assumed that the Amendment must
also evolve in other ways, to utilize as its basis evolving standards of
decency. It is a logical fallacy to conclude that because the Amend-
ment has changed in one way (it now includes proportionality re-
view), it must also change to include society's evolving preferences.
The Court laid the foundation for one argument and then substituted
a different conclusion, albeit one that used similar diction. The
reader is left believing that he has just been persuaded that the Eighth
Amendment must utilize an evolving standard of decency.
3. Coker v. Georgia
The Court applied the Gregg "test" only a year later when it de-
cided Coker v. Georgia.64 At issue in Coker was whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited capital punishment for the crime of rape of
57 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-72 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 366, 368).
58 Id. at 172-73.
59 Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
60 Id. at 170.
61 Id. at 168-73.
62 See id. (emphasis added).
63 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
64 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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an adult woman. 65 In yet another fragmented opinion,66 the Court
held that capital punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman
was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment" forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment.6 7 Coker was the "first modern decision in
which the Supreme Court . . . relied on disproportionality to invali-
date a punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause. ' 68 As part of its reasoning, the Court noted, "In sustaining the
imposition of the death penalty in Gregg. . . the Court firmly em-
braced the holdings and dicta from prior cases [including Furman,
Trop, and Weems], to the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not
only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'ex-
cessive' in relation to the crime committed. '69 The Court continued,
"Under Gregg, a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime.''7° The Court then analyzed the individual
states' rape statutes and found that all but three states did not allow
capital punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman. 71 Based
largely on this analysis, the Court concluded that capital punishment
was an impermissible punishment for the rape of an adult woman. 72
4. Harmelin v. Michigan
In Harmelin v. Michigan,73 some members of the Court attempted
to retreat from-or limit-the evolving standards of decency and pro-
portionality approach to the Eighth Amendment.7 4 In Harmelin, the
Court decided whether a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punish-
65 Id. at 586.
66 Justice White announced the judgment of the Court in which Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 586. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell
filed separate concurrences. Id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, with Rehnquist, J., joining).
67 Id. at 592.
68 Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 990 (1978).
69 Coker, 433 U.S. at 591-92.
70 Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 593-96.
72 Id. at 592 & n.4.
73 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
74 Id. at 962-82.
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ment.75 Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Scalia stated
that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee in
non-capital cases; 76 instead, the cruel and unusual punishments clause
was directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment. 77 He
therefore concluded that the petitioner's mandatory life sentence did
not violate the Eighth Amendment.78 Although only Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined in this part of Justice Scalia's opinion,7 9 three Jus-
tices concurred in the opinion because they felt that the punishment
was not constitutionally disproportionate.8"
It is interesting to note, however, that as recently as 1991 in
Harmelin, the debate continued as to what, at the highest level, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits. It is clear after Harmelin that a majority
of'Justices on the Court believe that the Eighth Amendment does con-
tain a proportionality requirement. And it is clear that a majority of
Justices are willing to utilize the evolving standards of decency test to
determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition. In fact, in Atkins (and in other
cases), even Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia (whose Harme-
lin opinion was joined by no other Justices) appeared to adopt the
evolving standards legal framework.8' Based on Harmelin, it appears
as though Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist believe that the
Eighth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits only certain modes of pun-
ishment. Yet, at least in death penalty cases, they are willing to defer
to "precedent" and to the Court's "death is different" jurisprudence,
and employ an evolving standards of decency test.
75 Id. at 961.
76 Id. at 965. Justice Scalia argued that the clause contains no proportionality
requirement, but concedes that the Court's death penalty jurisprudence often uti-
lized proportionality analysis based on evolving standards of decency. "Proportional-
ity review is one of several respects in which we have held that 'death is different' and
have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides. We would
leave it there, but will not extend it further." Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
77 Id. at 979 (quoting Granucci, supra note 11, at 842); see also id. at 979-86 (dis-
cussing early interpretations of the Eighth Amendment by politicians and courts).
78 Id. at 996.
79 Id. at 961.
80 Id. at 1008-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring, with O'Connor & Souter, J.J.,
joining).
81 SeeAtkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2253 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("In making determinations about whether a punishment is 'cruel and unusual'
under the evolving standards of decency embraced by the Eighth Amendment, we
have emphasized that legislation is the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values.'").
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D. Reasoned Substantive Due Process?
What is not clear from case law is why a majority of the Court
came to the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment uses as its litmus
test the evolving standards of decency. The history of the adoption of
the Amendment, as discussed above, 82 lends little support to the
Court's interpretation. In fact, as has been shown, the history of the
adoption of the Amendment shows that the Eighth Amendment was
adopted only to proscribe certain methods of punishment."" As has
also been shown, the Trop plurality more or less created the evolving
standards test, citing no authority for it. s4 Because there is little sup-
port for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment, by its own
terms, utilizes an evolving standards of decency test, one may wonder
how the Court has come to interpret the Amendment in such a
manner.
When courts over the last fifty years have interpreted the Eighth
Amendment, it appears that what they have really done is engage in
substantive due process lawmaking under the guise of the Eighth
Amendment. This must be the case, because courts have not con-
fined their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to either the history or
text of the Amendment itself. Instead, what they have done is take a
seemingly altruistic principle-that punishment for crimes should be
supported by an enlightened majority of the population-and consti-
tutionalized it.
Constitutionalization of moral principles was not uncommon for
the Court at the time Trop was decided. In fact, during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, the Court constitutionalized several fundamental
rights. In Griswold v. Connecticut,85 the Court recognized a fundamen-
tal right to privacy within the marital bedroom. In Loving v. Virginia,s"
the Court recognized a fundamental right to marry. In Roe v. Wade,8 7
one of the most controversial cases in recent history, the Court recog-
nized a fundamental right to choose to have an abortion. In all of
these cases and others like them, the Court looked beyond the history
and text of the Constitution to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment
and recognize a fundamental right. In a similar way, the Warren
Court, followed by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, has looked be-
yond the history and text of the Eighth Amendment to recognize a
82 See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
85 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
87 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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right to a certain "kind" of punishment. Yet there is a fundamental
difference between the substantive due process cases referenced
above and the Eighth Amendment line of cases. The substantive due
process cases provided historical, precedential, social, and political
reasons in support of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment in a
certain way, where the Eighth Amendment cases did not. This is not
to say that these types of reasons do not exist in the Eighth Amend-
ment context, only that the Court has not adequately explained them.
First, Trop provided no support for its language that announced
the evolving standards of decency test.8 8 Since the time of Trop, judi-
cial proponents of the evolving standards test tend to cite Trop for the
proposition that the Amendment uses the evolving standards test. In
Atkins, Justice Stevens wrote,
A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards
that prevailed in 1685 when LordJeffreys presided over the "Bloody
Assizes" or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those
that currently prevail. As Chief Justice Warren explained in his
opinion in Trop v. Dulles: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.89
The preceding excerpt comprises the majority's entire discussion
of the evolving standards test.9°1 The opinion cited Trop as conclusive
and moved on. Since the 1958 opinion in Trop, no Supreme Court
majority has ever articulated a reason why this must be the standard by
which Eighth Amendment claims are to be judged. Rather, what usu-
ally happens is that a plurality of the Court cites Trop9' as authorita-
tive and proceeds.
E. Evolving Standards Conclusion
This analysis does not purport to contend that the Eighth
Amendment cannot require proportionality. This analysis does not
purport to contend that the Eighth Amendment cannot utilize an
evolving standards of decency test. This analysis does not even con-
tend that the Eighth Amendment should not do either of the two.
Rather, if the Court is going to engage in this type ofjudicial activism,
it should at least justify its reasons for doing so. A citation to an old,
88 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
89 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002) (citations omitted).
90 See id.
91 Courts also sometimes cite Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), to sup-
port Trop's conclusion. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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obscure, off-point, non-binding decision by a plurality is not enough.
After Atkins, it appears as though Trop's evolving standards of decency
test is not going away. But until a majority of the Court states a per-
suasive reason why this must or should be the standard, we should
question the legitimacy and continued evolution of the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.
II. Too MUCH DEFERENCE TO STATE ENACTMENTS
After adopting the evolving standards of decency test, the Atkins
Court held that the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the "legislation enacted by the country's legis-
latures."92 The Court then analyzed the states' laws on capital punish-
ment of the mentally retarded and found a consensus sufficient to
determine that the practice was contrary to our nation's evolving stan-
dards of decency, and therefore in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.93 This Part of the Note
contends that this level of deference to states' legislative enactments is
contrary to Court precedent and considerations of federalism, and an
abdication of the judicial role. Furthermore, this practice essentially
allows the Eighth Amendment to mean whatever democracy says it
means, a practice contrary to the nature of the Constitution. This Part
also questions whether state legislative enactments are a reliable indi-
cator of society's moral attitudes, and concludes that they are not.
A. Case Law
1. Trop v. Dulles
As with other analyses of the Eighth Amendment, Trop is the
starting point for this discussion. Recall that in Trop, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a statute that took away one's citizenship
as a punishment for wartime desertion of the armed forces.- 4 In find-
ing the statute unconstitutional, the Court undertook an important
discussion of how the Constitution, by its very nature, must trump
even the most well-reasoned statute. The Court stated,
[W]e are mindful of the gravity of the issue inevitably raised when-
ever the constitutionality of an Act of the National Legislature is
challenged.... Courts must not consider the wisdom of statutes but
92 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).
93 Id. at 2248-50.
94 See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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neither can they sanction as being merely unwise that which the
Constitution forbids.
We are oath-bound to defend the Constitution. This obligation
requires that congressional enactments be judged by the standards
of the Constitution. The Judiciary has the duty of implementing the
constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights.
*. . When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one
of these provisions, we have no choice but to enforce the para-
mount commands of the Constitution. We are sworn to do no
less.
9 5
While the explicit language from Trop applies directly to acts of
the national legislature, one need not look farther than McCulloch v.
Maryland for the proposition that the Constitution also trumps acts of
state governments that are contrary to the Constitution. 96 The follow-
ing will outline the evolution of the Eighth Amendment from a provi-
sion that protected citizens from the legislature to one that derives its
meaning from the legislature.
2. Gregg v. Georgia
In Gregg v. Georgia,97 the Court held that the death penalty is not
unconstitutional per se. Gregg is particularly relevant to this section of
the Note, however, because of its analysis of how evolving standards of
decency should obtain its meaning, and for its discussion of legislative
enactments. After its explanation of "excessiveness," 98 the Gregg
Court stated,
Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be ap-
plied with an awareness of the limited role to be played by the
courts. This does not mean that judges have no role to play, for the
Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative
power. 'Judicial review by definition, often involves a conflict be-
tween judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution
means or requires."99
Here, the Court noted that Eighth Amendment cases often in-
volve a conflict between state legislation and the Eighth Amendment
itself. The Court continued in a footnote, that while "legislative mea-
sures adopted by the people's chosen representatives provide one im-
portant means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is evident that
95 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103-04 (1958).
96 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
97 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also supra Part I.C.2.
98 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
99 Id. at 174 (quoting in part Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)).
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legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth
Amendment standards since that Amendment was intended to safe-
guard individuals from the abuse of legislative power." 0 1° This discus-
sion undertaken by the Gregg Court demonstrates that legislation is an
important indicator of contemporary values, but by the very nature of
the Constitution, state legislation cannot serve as a litmus test for fed-
eral constitutionality.
The Gregg Court then stated that, in a federal system, courts owe
considerable deference to state legislatures because state legislatures
are better suited to make policy determinations reflecting the moral
values of the people.' 0 ' The Court then examined the history of the
death penalty and its penological justifications before concluding,
In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly
wrong. Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consen-
sus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction,
require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evi-
dence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is
not withoutjustification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.10 2
The Gregg opinion is significant in several respects. First, it is im-
portant to note that Greggwarns that the Eighth Amendment is a "re-
straint upon the exercise of legislative power.""11 3 Second, Gregg
concedes that legislation is an objective factor that demonstrates the
moral consensus of the people, but warns that legislation alone can-
not serve as the embodiment of evolving standards of human de-
cency. 10 4 Third, the Court deferred, at least in part, to the state's
determination for reasons of federalism. 0 5 Finally, the relevant evolv-
ing standard of decency was a statewide standard, rather than a na-
tional standard."16 In subsequent cases, we will see the Gregg test
slowly, and somewhat innocuously, erode in a manner unfaithful to
Gregg and to the Eighth Amendment itself.
100 Id. at 174 n.19.
101 Id. at 175.
102 Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 174.
104 Id. at 174-75, 179-86.
105 Id. at 186-87.
106 See id.
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3. Coker v. Georgia
In Coker, 117 the Court was faced with the question whether capital
punishment was an acceptable punishment for the rape of an adult
woman.""' The Court held that it was not, and therefore such a sen-
tence violated the Eighth Amendment. In so holding, the Court uti-
lized the "legislation as an objective indicator of evolving standards of
decency" standard. The Court analyzed the various states' attitudes
toward capital punishment for the crime of rape, °9 and concluded
that " [t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty for
rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously
weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman."' 10 The Court analyzed
several other factors as evidence of the evolving standard of decency,
but the fact that a majority of states did not allow capital punishment
for rape carried much of the weight in the opinion.
Although the Coker Court purported to base its decision in part
upon Gregg's mandate that courts utilize legislative enactments as a
barometer for community morals, there is one important difference.
In Gregg, the Court focused on the enactments of Georgia's legislature
and implicitly defined the relevant community as Georgia. Recall the
language from Gregg: "[ c] onsiderations of federalism, as well as respect for
the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the
moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as
a sanction, require us to conclude . . . ."I'' Thus, Gregg's reliance on
legislative enactment appears to have been about deference to the
state legislature. In Coker, however, the relevant standard is a national
one. Hence, Coker is less about judicial deference to a state legislature
and more about reaching a national consensus.
4. Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh
In the years following Coker, the Court considered the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause several more times. 1 2 In Stanford v.
107 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coker is discussed sura in Part I.C.3.
108 See supra notes 64-72.
109 Coke, 433 U.S. at 593-96.
11O Id. at 596.
III See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982). For a discussion of these and other death penalty cases that discuss judi-
cial deference to state legislation, see generally Matthew E. Albers, Note, Legislative
Deference In Eighth Amendment Capital Sentencing Challenges: The Constitutional Inadequacy
ol the Current Judicial Approach, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 467, 468 (1999) (arguing that
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Kentucky, 1 3 the Court's jurisprudence made a fundamental shift." 4
Stanford presented the question whether the death penalty constituted
cruel and unusual punishment for a defendant sixteen or seventeen
years old.' 15 Justice Scalia, writing for a four Justice plurality, con-
cluded that because there existed no national consensus among state
legislatures,' 16 the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit capital pun-
ishment for sixteen- or seventeen-year olds. 1 7 The opinion placed a
great amount of weight on states' legislative enactments; it declined to
accept as evidence of contemporary values federal sentencing stat-
utes,"" jury determinations, 1 9 prosecutorial discretion to seek the
death penalty,120 public opinion polls,' 2 ' and official positions of pro-
fessional associations. 122 In fact, the opinion cited no additional basis
for its decision other than the lack of a national consensus as evi-
denced by state statutes. 123
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Stanford stated that the Eighth
Amendment demands that, after analyzing state statutes as the pri-
mary objective indicator of contemporary values, the Court conduct
proportionality review.' 2 4 In Penry v. Lynaugh,12 5 decided the same
day as Stanford, Justice O'Connor took a different approach. The is-
sue in Penry was whether the Eighth Amendment categorically ex-
empted the mentally retarded from capital punishment. 12 6 (Note that
this is the same issue as in Atkins.) 127 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, held that there did not exist a national consensus (as
evidenced by state legislation) against application of the death penalty
to the mentally retarded. 2 She then undertook proportionality re-
view (not joined by the majority) where she examined whether the
broad deference to state legislation is an abdication of the Court's duty to be the final
arbiter of the Constitution).
113 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion).
114 See Albers, supra note 112, at 481-82.
115 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65.
116 See id. at 370-71 & n.2.
117 Id. at 380.
118 Id. at 370-73.
119 Id. at 373-74.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 377.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 373; see also Albers, supra note 112, at 482-83 (making this same point).
124 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
126 Id. at 307.
127 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
128 Peny, 492 U.S. at 333-35.
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death penalty was appropriate given the penological justifications for
the death penalty, 29 and held that it was not unconstitutional.'3 °1 It is
interesting to note, however, that Justice O'Connor looked largely to
state statutes to determine culpability for her proportionality re-
view.'"" Thus, her proportionality review was largely guided by state
legislative enactments.
B. The Resulting Framework
After Stanford and Penry, it is not entirely clear to what extent
proportionality review affects an Eighth Amendment determina-
tion.' 3 2 It is clear, however, that a majority of the Court agrees that
the most reliable factor for determining contemporary values is legis-
lation enacted by state legislatures. It also appears that-regardless of
the amount of work it does-proportionality review is used only if
there exists no national consensus. In Penry, Justice O'Connor under-
took proportionality review only after a review of state legislation failed
to evidence a national consensus.1 33 In other words, if there exists a
national consensus that prohibits a punishment, that ends the inquiry.
If, however, there exists no national consensus, then proportionality
review may still make the punishment unconstitutional.
Other courts, however, have interpreted the relationship between
proportionality and state legislation differently. For example, in
Duran v. Castro, in which a prisoner challenged his conviction for pos-
session of heroine as "cruel and unusual," the district court stated,
The Supreme Court has prescribed the process for such a review as
first requiring the reviewing court to determine whether a "thresh-
old comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." If so, the court
should.., compare the challenged sentence with... "the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions." 134
129 Id. at 337-38.
130 Id. at 338 ("On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot conclude
that all mentally retarded people ... lack the... culpability associated with the death
penalty.").
131 Id. at 337 ("It is clear that mental retardation has long been regarded as a
factor that may diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act."). Justice
O'Connor next analyzed state statutes. Id. at 337-38 & nn.2-3.
132 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Note in Harmelin the debate
between Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and White as to whether the Eighth Amendment
requires proportionality analysis. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text for
justice Scalia's position. Recall, however, that Harnelin dealt with a non-capital case.
133 Pery, 492 U.S. at 333-36.
134 227 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citations omitted).
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In Atkins itself, it is not entirely clear how the Court applied the
proportionality test. Justice Stevens's majority opinion stated, "Pro-
portionality review under those evolving standards should be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. We have
pinpointed that the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legisla-
tures.' "135 He later stated, "[W] e shall first review the judgment of
legislatures that have addressed the suitability of imposing the death
penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider [other] reasons
for agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment." 1 3 6
It appears then, that after Atkins, a majority of the Court con-
strues the Eighth Amendment to require a proportionality review that
uses as its baseline the legislative enactments of the states. If the state
enactments provide no consensus, or a questionable consensus, then
courts may still declare a punishment cruel and unusual for other
reasons.
C. Problems with the Legal Framework
This legal framework, in a sense, raises Eighth Amendment pro-
tections to at least whatever level a majority of the states favors. This
,type of framework also raises several significant legal questions that
the Court has failed to address. First, this high level of deference to
decisions of state legislatures, it has been argued, is an abdication of
the proper judicial role.' 3 7 This argument contends that it is the re-
sponsibility of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, and
that deferring to state legislatures is an abdication of this responsibil-
ity. This Note, however, will not address this argument, other than to
make the reader aware of it. Second, and more important for this
analysis, this type of legal framework for interpreting the Eighth
Amendment raises serious questions of federalism and state sover-
eignty in general. Why can the federal government, through the vehi-
cle of the Supreme Court, tell states in what manner they may punish?
Finally, this legal framework, which uses state legislation as the best
indicator of contemporary values, fails to measure adequately popular
consensus.
135 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002) (citations omitted).
136 Id. at 2248.
137 See generally Albers, supra note 112.
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1. Federalism and State Sovereignty
The simple answer to the question "why can the federal govern-
ment tell states in what manner they may punish?" is that the Eighth
Amendment has been incorporated against the states. 138 The not-so-
simple answer, however, is more complex than that. It was clear after
Gregg that the relevant community whose standards were to be applied
was the state.' 39 After Coker, Stanjbrd, and Penry, however, it is clear
that the national community's standards govern. 14 It seems contrary
to principles of state sovereignty that Virginia should have to change
its state laws because citizens in Arizona and South Dakota passed
state statutes exempting the mentally retarded from capital punish-
ment. The problem with this framework is not that the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states; rather, the issue is that the Eighth
Amendment, which constantly re-derives its meaning based upon the
actions of a majority of states, then applies this meaning to other states.
It is well established (outside of the Eighth Amendment context)
that each state's authority to regulate extends no farther than its own
boundaries.' 41 Alabama could not, for example, pass a statute that
regulates conduct that occurs in another state and whose conse-
quences are felt only in that state. Alabama could not pass a law that
set the Virginia speed limit at forty-five miles per hour. To even sug-
gest that it could would be absurd. 142 Nor could Alabama take actions
that had the effect of reducing Virginia's speed limit to forty-five miles
138 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits punishment (i.e., 90-day incarceration) for those found
to be addicted to narcotics).
139 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
141 See Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction .... Each State is independent of all the
others in this particular."); see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989)
(noting that the Constitution has a "special concern ... with the autonomy of the
individual States within their respective spheres").
142 See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914). The Court noted,
[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate be-
yond the jurisdiction of that State . . .without throwing down the constitu-
tional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their
lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under
the Constitution depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the
Constitution that it has rarely been called in question and hence authorities
directly dealing with it do not abound.
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per hour. 43 Likewise, for the Atkins Court to suggest that Virginia
must be bound by the actions of state legislatures of other states raises
serious questions about Virginia's sovereignty. Virginia's citizens
never consented to be governed by other states' statutes, nor did
Virginians ever have the opportunity to vote in other states' elections.
It is true that Virginians had the opportunity to participate in the
ratification process of the Eighth Amendment, as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment, which made the Eighth applicable to the states.
Yet the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that Virginians had the
opportunity to ratify did not, at the time, utilize a standard that al-
lowed a majority of other states to change the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. Indeed, the Constitution sets forth a specific procedure
required to amend the Constitution, 144 and there is little reason to
think that when Virginians ratified the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment they contemplated that the Supreme Court would
put in place a mechanism to skirt the amendment process. 145 The
response to this argument is that when Virginians had the opportunity
to participate in the ratification process, the decision to ratify was not
only the decision to adopt the text of the amendments, but also the
decision to adopt Supreme Court interpretation of that text.
Whatever the outcome of this debate, it is worthwhile to note the
Court's apparent lack of concern for its quashing of state sovereignty.
143 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State does not ac-
quire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because
the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that
State.").
144 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
145 The current Eighth Amendment interpretation creates tension with Article V,
and may be viewed as circumventing the amendment process. At the very least, the
current framework blurs the line between constitutionally permissible constitutional
interpretation by the judiciary and the Article V process for amending the Constitu-
tion. For example, if a majority of states were to abolish the death penalty, then pre-
sumably the Court would find the death penalty unconstitutional, relying on state
legislation as the most reliable objective indicator of evolving standards of decency.
Holding the death penalty unconstitutional would not only change the understand-
ing of the Eighth Amendment, but it would also change the understanding of other
parts of the Constitution, For example, it would render all references to capital
crimes and capital punishment in the Constitution superfluous. It would change the
meaning of the Due Process Clauses, which state that the government cannot "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See id.
amend V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. One could argue that such a drastic evolution of the
Eighth Amendment's meaning essentially amends the Constitution, yet without fol-
lowing Article V's strict amendment procedures. It accomplishes the same end, yet
does so via an "end-run" around the procedural safeguards required to affect the
meaning of the Constitution.
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In Harmelin, however, Justice Scalia undertook some discussion of the
effect of other states' legislation. He wrote,
That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that
other States punish with the mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori
from the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act that
other States do not criminalize at all. Indeed, a State may criminal-
ize an act that other States choose to reward-punishing, for exam-
ple, the killing of endangered wild animals for which other States
are offering a bounty. What greater disproportion could there be
than that? "Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical
to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the
distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any
other State." Diversity not only in policy, but in the means of imple-
menting policy, is the very raison d'etre of our federal system....
The Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary con-
sensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitu-
tional maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered
beliefs and responding to changed social conditions. 146
Yet it appears that the Eighth Amendment has become the
ratchet of which Justice Scalia wrote. This ratchet can be turned by a
simple majority of the states, forcing all other states to abide by their
policy decisions.
It is interesting to take this abstract argument about federalism,
and bring it to a more concrete level. The following is an example of
why considerations of federalism should persuade the Court that its
reliance on state legislative enactments should be abandoned. Con-
sider a criminal defendant who claims that his punishment for drunk
driving is cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Assume further that the severity of his punishment, on a scale of 1 to
10, ranks a 4. The court, in adjudicating his case, looks to state legisla-
tion and determines that there exists a consensus that other states'
punishments for drunk driving tend to rank a 2 or 3 in terms of their
severity. Therefore, the court, applying the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment framework, would declare the punishment cruel and un-
usual because it is disproportionate to the offense.1 47
146 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989-90 (1991) (plurality opinion) (ci-
tations omitted). Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this part of Justice Scalia's
opinion.
147 Query whether this type of comparison to other states' legislation really tells
whether the punishment is disproportionate to the offense. It seems more realistic
that all that this comparison really tells is that the punishment is disproportionate to
the punishment utilized by other states.
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Yet, imagine that the state imposing the punishment of severity
level 4 was Utah. Assume that many citizens of Utah do not consume
alcohol and believe that drunkenness is immoral. Assume further that
they believe that driving while drunk is very immoral, and poses a
great safety risk. So citizens of Utah try to deter drunk driving, which
they view as a greater harm than do citizens of other states, by attach-
ing to it a more severe penalty. If Utah makes the judgment that
drunk driving is a more serious crime than do other states, should not
their criminal laws be allowed to reflect that judgment?
One of the benefits of federalism is that if one is intent on driving
while drunk, he can move next door to Nevada, where (for purposes
of the hypothetical) the practice is considered less offensive and
therefore is punished less severely. Society ends up with two happy
communities; Utah-where almost no drunk driving occurs (and
whose citizens like this fact)-and Nevada, where citizens can drive
while intoxicated with little fear of being harshly punished.
If this hypothetical seems unrealistic, consider then the First
Amendment and obscenity law. The First Amendment defines pros-
cribeable obscenity by reference to what the local community thinks
about it. 48 Hence, in a more conservative community, certain works
may be prohibited (or their distribution may be punished) because
they are offensive to the community, even though these works would
be allowed in a majority of communities that are presumably more
liberal. This means that a person may be punished for distributing
obscenity in Utah, while the same conduct may be perfectly accept-
able in Nevada. Why should the same set of rules not apply to punish-
ment in general? Or, at the very least, why does not the Eighth
Amendment govern the punishment of obscenity? 49 If the First
Amendment is reducible to a local community, and one's First
Amendment protections depend to some degree on locality and local
morals, why cannot Eighth Amendment rights depend to some degree
148 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). One prong of the Miller
obscenity test is "whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est." Id. at 24.
149 One can foresee an Eighth Amendment challenge to an obscenity charge.
Under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one may expect the Court to
look at the material in question and determine if a majority ofjurisdictions (or states)
would punish its distribution. If a majority would, so can the jurisdiction in question.
If a majority of states would not punish the distribution of the material, the jurisdic-
tion in question would be precluded from doing so, because such punishment would
be prohibited as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
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on locality and local morals? The Court has not provided a satisfac-
tory answer. Indeed, the Court has provided no answer.
2. Legislation Is an Unreliable Indicator of Consensus
In addition to trampling state sovereignty, utilizing state legisla-
tion as the best indicator of evolving standards of decency raises other
problems. Namely, state legislation is not the best indicator of a popu-
lar national attitude. 15 11 At the time of the founding of the Constitu-
tion, there was great debate as to the question of state representation
in the federal government. Although a drastic oversimplification, the
debate was whether each state should receive equal representation in
the federal government, or whether representation should be based
on state population. The resulting compromise created a House of
Representatives where state representation was based on population,
and a Senate where each state received equal representation. 151 A
similar problem applies to the question of popular attitudes toward
punishment.
Simply put, a majority of states could form a consensus sufficient
to evolve meaning of the Eighth Amendment, even though a majority
of the people do not support such evolution. Because of such out-
comes, the judicially created measuring stick does a poor job of quan-
tifying that which it is supposed to measure. As a result, if the Court is
determined to continue to utilize an evolving national consensus stan-
dard, it should come up with a better device to measure evolving na-
tional consensus.
3. Legislation May Not Be as "Objective" as the Court Thinks
The third problem with utilizing state legislation as an objective
indicator of national consensus is that state legislation may not be as
objective as the Court thinks it is. In Atkins, much of the difference in
150 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLIcY 48-54 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining inter-
est group theories of the legislative process and the power of special interests in pass-
ing statutes); id. at 54-60 (explaining public choice theories of the legislative
process, including the idea of rent extraction); see also id. at 65-73 (explaining
proceduralist theories of legislation, which state that it is easier to block legislation
than to enact it). Proceduralist theories of legislation that state that it is more difficult
to pass statutes than to block their passage lend support to the proposition that public
support for exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty is actually more
prevalent than is indicated by state statutes. Regardless of what outcome these theo-
ries lead to with respect to capital punishment for the mentally retarded, they demon-
strate that state legislation is not, in fact, the best indicator of popular values.
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. § 3, cl. 1.
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opinion between the majority and Justice Scalia's dissent was based on
the question what should count in the survey of state legislation. For
example, twelve states do not permit capital punishment of any
kind.' 52 Are those states' legislative enactments relevant to the narrow
question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punish-
ment for the mentally retarded? Justice Stevens's majority opinion
counted New York among the states that had outlawed application of
the death penalty to the mentally retarded.' 53 New York's law, how-
ever, allowed the sentence of death for a person who is mentally re-
tarded if the killing occurred while that person was confined.
154
Furthermore, Justice Stevens found persuasive a bill passed by the
Texas legislature but vetoed by the governor.' 55 While this bill may be
persuasive evidence of what the people of Texas think, 56 does it com-
port with the Court's test that the "clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures"?1 57 Strictly speaking, it does not, for the bill
was never enacted. In his analysis, Justice Stevens continued, by not-
ing that similar provisions passed at least one house in several other
states. 158 This fact has little relevance if the Court was looking strictly
for enactments of state legislatures, as it purported to do. Surely these
facts would be relevant if the Court were merely trying to gauge popu-
lar attitudes. But in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court pur-
ports to be doing more than that. It purports to be relying on
"legislation enacted by the country's legislatures" as the "clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."' 59 Justice
Stevens's approach seems to "subjectify" this inquiry, at least to some
extent.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that of the thirty-eight
states that allow capital punishment, less than half (eighteen) have
enacted legislation that exempts the mentally retarded.' 6° If one as-
152 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2261 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2248.
154 Id. at 2248 & n.13. New York's law states that a sentence of death "may not be
set aside ... upon the ground that the defendant is mentally retarded" if "the killing
occurred while the defendant was confined or under custody in a state correctional
facility or local correctional institution." Id. at n.13; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
§ 400.27.12(d) (McKinney 2001-2002 Interim Pocket Part).
155 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2248-49 & n.16.
156 For the reasons stated in Part II.C.2, this bill may not be evidence of what
Texans in fact think about the issue.
157 Id. at 2247.
158 Id. at 2249.
159 Id. at 2247 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
160 Id. at 2261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sumes that states that ban the death penalty outright should not be
included in the count, then it appears that objectively speaking, there
exists no consensus about application of the death penalty to the men-
tally retarded. 16' Furthermore, of the eighteen states that have ex-
empted the mentally retarded from the death penalty, only seven have
fully exempted them.!62 The other eleven have, to some extent, still
allowed executions of the mentally retarded. 63 Yet the Atkins major-
ity utilized this state legislation as objective evidence for the proposi-
tion that all executions of the mentally retarded are prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. 164 Justice Stevens responded to this point by stat-
ing, "It is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change." 16 5
There more than likely does exist a nationwide consensus against
application of the death penalty to the mentally retarded. If there
does exist a consensus however, it is debatable whether it is evidenced
by state legislation. If state legislation does evidence a consensus, it is
even more debatable whether the consensus can really be gleaned in
an objective manner. Therefore, the Court's objective measuring stick
is rather subjective. If the Court is going to utilize subjective determi-
nations, it should openly do so and stop trying to utilize state legisla-
tion as an objective indicator. In the alternative, the Court should
adopt a new measuring stick that is actually objective.
4. Laws May Not Reflect Morality
Yet another limitation with the Court's utilization of state legisla-
tion as the best indicator of contemporary values is that the existence
or non-existence of legislation cannot necessarily be attributed to pub-
lic values.' 66 In Atkins, Justice Stevens wrote, "We have pinpointed
that the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contempo-
rary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.'"167
This assumes a direct correlation between morality and legislation; it
assumes that moral laws are enacted precisely because they are moral
161 If states that ban capital punishment outright are to be included in the tally,
then there is, objectively speaking, a consensus.
162 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 Several states have not made their statutes retroactive, which means that the
mentally retarded currently on death row could, in the states' judgment, be subject to
capital punishment. Id. at 2261-62. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 2249; see also id. at 2263 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 See supra note 150.
167 See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).
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and that immoral laws are not passed precisely because they are
immoral.
A law with a seemingly moral purpose may be the product of
many motivations other than morality. To assume that a law was en-
acted solely because of its moral undertones is naive and reflects a
misunderstanding of the legislative process. 168 Furthermore, society
may possess a certain moral belief, but may be unable to pass a law
reflecting that belief because a few dissenters hold key positions in
state legislatures and are able to block the passage of a bill. 169 There-
fore,Justice Stevens's claim that "the 'clearest and most reliable objec-
tive evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country's legislatures,' "171 is somewhat misguided. As a result, the
Court should look for some other objective indicator that also indi-
cates the purpose for the law's enactment. A better objective indicator
of contemporary values might be a preamble to the legislation, the
purpose clause of the legislation, or legislative history, which could
purportedly explain society's morality. 17 1 The fact that a state pun-
ishes a crime a certain way does not necessarily reflect the people's
moral stance on that issue. Rather, the punishment as explained by its
preamble, purpose clause, or legislative history is better evidence of
contemporary values. 172
CONCLUSION
The Court's Eighth Amendment, reaching its culmination in At-
kins, has "mis-evolved" into a strange and peculiar species. Since
Chief Justice Warren's famous line in Trop,'73 the Court has grasped
hold of Trop's language and declared that "evolving standards of de-
cency" is the hallmark of the Eighth Amendment. While the Eighth
168 The types of state laws at issue in Atkins-those exempting the mentally re-
tarded from capital punishment-more than likely were enacted based on citizens'
moral perceptions. However, this is certainly not the case with all types laws dealing
with punishment, and should not be assumed to be so.
169 See EsRIuIGE, supra note 150, at 66-67 (discussing the theory of "vetogates,"
which are "choke points" in the legislative process where a small minority can often
kill legislation).
170 Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).
171 This proposition, of course, assumes that society's moral reasons for passing a
statute can be reasonably gleaned from the statute's preamble, purpose clause, or
legislative history. This assumption is questionable.
172 It is true that introducing legislative history loses some of the objectivity that a
simple count of laws provides. It does, however, more accurately reflect society's
values.
173 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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Amendment could utilize an evolving standards test, no Court major-
ity has ever articulated a reason why this must be the case. The
Court's Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence dictates that courts analyze
state legislative enactments as objective evidence of society's evolving
standards. As a result, the Eighth Amendment's meaning changes
whenever a majority of states raise state protections. Therefore, the
meaning of the federal Constitution derives its meaning from current
popular consensus. This type of framework raises several problems,
not the least of which are considerations of federalism. Furthermore,
the Court's chosen measuring stick-legislative enactments-does a
poorjob of measuring. As a result, the Eighth Amendment continues
to evolve into a strange and peculiar beast. Darwin would be
dumbfounded.
